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Brooks v. Valley National Bank (Sup.Ct. of Ariz., 
April, 1976), 548 P.2d 1166 ("Brooks II"), supersedes the 
opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Brooks v. Valley 
National Bank, 539 P.2d 958 (1975) ("Brooks I"), cited at 
page 31 of respondent's brief. Brooks II sustained the 
Superior Court's granting of motion to dismiss the action, 
as did Brooks I, holding: (a) a trust was not created for 
the impounded funds even though the words "in trust" were 
used in the mortgage documents, and (b) the bank was not 
unjustly enriched through use of the funds. The reasoning 
follows the opinion in Brooks I cited in respondent's brief. 
The concurring opinion in Brooks II reasoned that a trust 
was created because the bank received the funds to be applied 
to a particular purpose but, nevertheless, the dismissal of 
the complaint was still proper, saying: 
Brooks relies on the general rule of law 
that it is the duty of a trustee to pro-
tect the interests of the beneficiary of 
a trust by the exercise of reasonable 
care and diligence in the management of 
the trust property, Bulla v. Valley Na-
tional Bank of Phoenix, 82 Ariz. 84, 308 
P.2d 932 (1957), and the general rule that 
that trustee has a duty to invest the 
trust property so that it is made produc-
tive for the beneficiary. Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, §181 (1959). Where, 
however, a rule of law might otherwise 
be applicable to an agreement, custom or 
usage may make such rule of law inappli-
cable. Williston, Law of Contracts, 
§648 (3rd ed. 1961). 
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The practice of requiring impound 
payments has existed since the early 
1930fs. In every instance, without ex-
ception, where a suit has been brought 
to compel payment of interest or the 
earnings on the investment of the impound 
funds, the lending institution has not 
paid the mortgagor for the use of the im-
pound funds. Nor is there anywhere the 
slightest suggestion that the Valley Na-
tional Bank or any lending institution 
ever paid for the use of impound funds. 
While a few isolated instances will 
not prove a usage, one so firmly estab-
lished for so many years nationwide should 
be controlling. A usage will be binding if 
it is uniform, long established, and so 
well known that it can be said that the 
parties contracted with reference to it 
and the failure to conform to it would be 
the exception. Cleveland etc. R.R. Co. v. 
Jenkins, 174 111 398, 51 N.E. 811. Nor 
is a usage invalid because its effect is 
different from a general rule of law. 
It is well settled that a trade 
usage which is contrary to a statute 
or which contravenes public policy is 
invalid and may not be invoked; but 
where a rule of law is of a character 
that the parties may make it inappli-
cable to their contract by express 
agreement, they may likewise render 
it inapplicable by implied usage or 
by usage." Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 
F.2d 425, 431 (10th Cir. 1936). 
I am therefore of the opinion that by 
banking usage neither interest nor earnings 
on investment was expected to be credited 
to the mortgagor. 
A not-yet-reported decision is Throp v. Bell 
Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, Ill.App.Ct., Docket No. 
60252, decided July 26, 1976, aff'd on rehearing, 10-7-76. 
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It affirmed granting of defendant's motion to dismiss of 
plaintiff's claim for earnings on the escrow funds, saying 
"the use or non-use of the words fin trust1 is not the 
controlling criteria as to whether an express trust has or 
has not been created." It is the most recent decision on 
the subject and contains a review of recent authorities 
similar to other cases cited in respondent's brief. Its 
reasoning is applicable to appellants' simplistic argument 
as to use of the word "pledge" in the mortgage document. 
Finally, we cite the Report of Committee on Real 
Estate Financing entitled "Class Actions Under Antitrust 
Laws on Account of Escrow and Similar Practices," Real 
Property Probate and Trust Journal of the American Bar 
Association Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, 
Volume 11, No. 2, Summer, 1976. It concludes: 
If lenders begin to pay interest on 
escrow accounts, realistically the addi-
tional expenses that result will in some 
manner be borne by borrowers either by 
a carrying charge or increase in the loan 
rates which would cover these expenses. 
In short the payment of interest on escrow 
accounts would not result in any economic 
benefit to borrowers and would in all proba-
bility increase costs at least on smaller 
loans. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of November, 
1976, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Respondent's 
Brief of Newly Uncovered Cases were delivered to Robert J. DeBry, 
attorney for plaintiffs, 2040 East 4800 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
13JUN1377 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Gark Law School 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY A. 
MADSEN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 14530 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN 
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE BRYANT H. CROFT, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Joseph J. Palmer, of 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
ROBERT J. DeBRY 
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorneys for Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
FACTS . , 2 
ARGUMENT 6 
POINT I. SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS MITIGATE AGAINST 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM 6 
POINT II. BORROWFRS DO NOT OWN OP. RETAIN ANY 
INTEREST IN THE RESERVE FUNDS 18 
POINT III. UNDER NO THEORY IS DEFENDANT LIAELE 
FOR EARNINGS ON THE RESERVE; DEFENDANT 
HAS NOT BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED 21 
POINT IV. THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION 
SHOWS THE PARTIES DID NOT INTEND THE 
CONTRACT TO REQUIRE PAYMENT OF INTEREST 
OR EARNINGS ON THE RESERVE; SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS HERE PROPER 42 
CONCLUSION 46 
CASES CITED 
Abrams v. Crocker Citizens National Bank (1974), 114 
Cal.Rptr. 913 42,43,4 
Baugh v. Parley, 184 P. 2d 335 (Utah, 1947) 21 
Brooks v. Valley National Bank (Ariz. 1975), 539 P.2d 958 . . 23,31, 
I 41,45 
Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Svgs. & Loan Assn. (Pa. 1974), 
320 A.2d 117 41,43,4 
46 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 U.2d 261, 501 P.2d 
266 (1972) 43 
Bui lough v. Sims, 16 U. 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965) 44 
Cale v. American Nat'l Bank (1973), 370 Ohio Misc. 56 . . . . 23 
11 
Campbell v. Peter, 108 Utah 565, 167 P.2d 754 (1945) . . . . 31 
Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Savings Bank (Carpenter I) 
(Mass. 1973), 291 N.E.2d 609 31,40,41 
43,45,46 
Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Savings Bank (Carpenter II) 
(Mass. 1976) 346 N.E.2d 892 14,23,36 
41,45 
Central Suffolk Hospital Association v. Downs, 213 N.Y.S.2d 
192 (1961) 19 
Durkee v. Franklin Sav. Assn. (111. 1974), 309 N.E.2d 118 . . 23,39,40 
First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Lincoln v. 
The Board of Equalization of Lancaster County, 152 N.W.2d 
8 (Neb. 1967) : . . . . 18 
Gibson v. First Federal of Detroit (C.A.6th 1974), 504 F.2d 
826 23 
Graybeal v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 20 
(D.D.C. 1973) 16 
Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 U.2d 320, 266 P.2d 494 (1954). 44 
In re Simon, 167 F.Supp. 214 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) 19 
Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 365 
F.Supp. 975 (E.D.Pa. 1973) 23 
Manchester Gardens, Inc. v. Great West Life Assurance Co. 
(C.A.D.C. 1953), 205 F.2d 872 . 23 
Pack v. Dunn, 84 Utah 597, 37 P.2d 790 20 
Richman v. Security Savings & Loan Assn. (Wise. 1973), 204 
N.W.2d 511 23 
Schott v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Pa. 1969), 
259 A.2d 443 22 
Sears v. Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 275 N.E.2d 300 
(111. 1971) 23,28,30 
32 
Stavrides v. Maryland National Bank (W.D.Pa. 1973), 353 
F.Supp. 1972 23 
Stavrides v. Mellon National Bank (1973), 487 F.2d 953 . . . 23 
iii 
Surrey Strathmore Corp. v. Dollar Savings Bank of New York 
(C.A.N.Y. 1975), 36 N.Y.2d 173, 325 N.E.2d 527 23,37,44 
Tierney v. Whitestone Sav. & Loan Assn., 83 Misc.2d 855, 
373 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1975) 23 
Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (Ark. 1972), 381 
S.W.2d 725 23 
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) 12 
Umdenstock v. Am. Mortgage & Investment Co. (D.C.Okla. 1973), 
363 F.Supp. 1375 23 
Valerio v. College Point Savings Bank, 48 Misc.2d 91, 264 
N.Y.S.2d 343 (1965) 19 
Wilcox v. Gauntlett (Mich.), 166 N.W. 856 31 
Yudkin v. Avery Savings (Ken. 1974), 507 S.W.2d 689 21,23 
Zeese v. Estate of Siegel (Utah, 1975), 534 P.2d 85 44 
Zelickman v. Bell Federal Savings (111. 1973), 301 N.E.2d 
47 . . 22,24,28 
30 
STATUTES CITED 
U.C.A. 1953, S7-7-5(e)(3) 5 
U.C.A. 1953, §7-12-47(1)(2) 5 
U.C.A. 1953, §75-5-5(a) (3) 13 
REGULATIONS CITED 
12 C.F.R., §545.6-ll(c) 4,17 
12 C.F.R., §545.6-l(a) (4) (iii) (1972) 9 
203.19 C.F.R. (1971) 8 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
66 Am.Jur.2d, Restitution and Implied Contracts, §3, p. 945 . 35 
47 C.J.S. Interest, §3, p. 13 20 
47 C.J.S. Interest, §12, p. 23 31 
72 C.J.S. Pledges, §9, p. 10 31 
3 Corbin on Contracts §558 (1960) , p. 249 et seq 44 
iv 
Restatement of Contracts, §237, comment b . . . 
Restatement of Restitution, §107(1) 
Restatement (2d), Trusts, §12, comment 1 (1959) 
Restatement (2d), Trusts, §12, comment e . . . 
Anno. 50 A.L.R. 2d 697 
4 A.Scott, Law of Trust §530 (3d Ed. 1967) . . 
Bogert, Trust and Trustees, §111 (2d Ed. 1964) 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY A. 
MADSEN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. L4530 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a contract action. Plaintiffs, as bor-
rowers, executed a trust deed to defendant lender in a 
typical residental mortgage transaction. As required by the 
trust deed, for 11 years plaintiffs paid defendant monthly 
payments of principal and interest, and a "budget payment" 
of 1/12 of estimated annual real property taxes and insur-
ance premiums, without expectation of receiving any compen-
sation on the budget payments. Although the contract is 
silent on the subject, plaintiffs now complain that defen-
dant should pay plaintiffs the net earnings on such budget 
payments on a theory of unjust enrichment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, denied plain-
tiffs1 motion for partial summary judgment as to liability 
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and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dis-
missing the complaint, no cause of action (R.479-80). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant prays the judgment be affinned, and that 
it be awarded its costs on appeal. 
FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute. Only a few addi-
tions are necessary to plaintiffs1 Statement of Facts. 
On September 21, 1964, plaintiffs, as borrowers, 
executed to defendant a trust deed (R.2). By paragraph 4 
of the trust deed (R.5), plaintiffs promised to pay and have 
paid defendant, for 11 years, not only monthly payments of 
principal and interest, but also a monthly payment of 1/12 
of estimated annual real property taxes and insurance pre-
miums on the mortgaged property, referred to variously in 
the cases as "budget payments," "reserves,"1 "impounds" or 
"escrows". 
The interest rate on plaintiffs' loan, still 
unpaid, is 6-1/2 percent per annum. 
The complaint sought to require defendant to pay 
interest or earnings on the reserves, although no provision 
is made for such under the contract. The complaint claimed 
two theories: (1) breach of contract, or (2) unjust enrich-
ment. 
Plaintiffs' complaint, paragraphs 13 through 16 
(R.3) alleges the trust deed includes an "implied term" that 
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defendant will pay reasonable interest on mbnies paid to it 
for payment of taxes and insurance, that defendant has 
breached the contract by not paying any interest to plain-
tiffs, and that defendant is liable for such unpaid inter-
est. The claim for interest apparently has been abandoned 
on appeal (appellants1 brief, p.l). 
Paragraphs 17 through 21 of the complaint (R.3-4) 
set forth alternative allegations of unjust enrichment to 
the effect that defendant has earned a substantial profit 
from the use of the reserve fund "belonging to plaintiffs," 
thereby becoming unjustly enriched, and praying for resti-
tution of the earnings represented by such unjust enrich-
ment. That apparently is the only claim urged on appeal 
(appellants1 brief, pp.l# 17-18). 
The pertinent portions of the contract, the trust 
deed (R.5, 58-59), are paragraphs 2 and 4 (R.5). It is 
accurately quoted on pages 2 and 3 of plaintiffs' brief. 
Plaintiffs testified on deposition that: 
(1) When plaintiffs executed the trust deed they 
knew the trust deed required them to pay the monthly 
budget payments (depo., pp.9-10, 26). j 
(2) Plaintiffs, at execution, knew defendant 
would not pay plaintiffs interest or earnings on the 
budget payments (depo., p.26). Plaintiffs thought that 
unfair at the time (depo., p.47), but had no discussion 
with defendant's personnel as to the required budget 
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payments or as to payment of interest or earnings 
thereon (depo., p.10). 
(3) Since 1964, plaintiffs have paid all such 
budget payments each month without expectation that 
defendant would pay interest or earnings on such re-
serves (depo., p.26), and plaintiffs have never asked 
for payment of earnings or that budget payments not be 
commingled (depo., pp.23, 25). 
Defendant's affidavit states why, for 20 years, 
its policy has been to require the reserve payments and why 
it has not paid interest or earnings on them (R.282-4). 
Plaintiffs admit (plaintiff's brief, p. 3) that 
the requirement of collection of monthly budget payments is 
standard or required procedure for lenders, as evidenced by 
the Federal regulations and state statutes quoted in their 
brief, pp. 3-5, 
A new regulation was promulgated by the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board on June 16, 1975 to prescribe the 
circumstances under which federal savings and loan associa-
tions, such as defendant, may pay interest on escrows. It 
provides (12C.F.R., §545.6-11(c)): 
A Federal association which makes a loan 
on or after June 16, 1975, on the security 
of a single-family dwelling occupied or to 
be occupied by the borrower (except such a 
loan for which a bona fide commitment was 
made before that date) shall pay interest 
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on any escrow account maintained in connec-
tion with such a loan (1) if there is in 
effect a specific statutory provision or 
provisions of the State in which such dwell-
ing is located by or under the State-chartered 
savings and loan associations, mutual savings 
banks and similar institutions are generally 
required to pay interest on such escrow ac-
counts
 F and (2) at not less than the rate 
required to be paid by such State-chartered 
institutions but not to exceed the rate being 
paid by the Federal association in its regu-
lar accounts (as defined in Section 526.1 of 
this chapter). Except as provided by con-
tract , a Federal association shall have no 
obligation to pay interest on escrow accounts 
apart from the duties imposed by this para-
graph. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah statutes are silent as to any requirement that interest 
be paid on escrows; indeed the silence in the authorization 
statutes (§§7-7-5(e) (3) and 7-12-47 (1) (2), U.C.A. 1953), is 
deafening. 
Plaintiffs1 reserve account for 1974 (Exhibit A 
attached to plaintiff Madsens" deposition) shows an average 
monthly balance of $275.47 (by adding monthly balances and 
dividing by 12), on which the gross earnings atf say, five 
percent per annum, would be $13.77 for the year before 
considering defendant's cost of handling the account and 
producing the earnings. Defendant estimated the cost would 
be more than $16 per account per year (R.287). 
On this record, the lower court granted defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs' 
motion for partial summary judgment on liability (R.479-80). 
Plaintiffs filed timely appeal. 
- 6 -
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS MITIGATE AGAINST 
PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIM 
Plaintiffs' claim is controlled by the contract 
between the parties. Nevertheless, actions of this type 
have become very popular lately, as will be seen by the 
number of cases recently filed in other jurisdictions, all 
unsuccessful. The reason for the popularity is set forth in 
appellants1 brief, pp.21-2: 
The concept of setting aside a prorata 
share of annual tax and insurance costs each 
month in a separate account arises from the 
experience of lenders during the depression 
of the 1930's, when many people lost their 
homes in tax foreclosures. In order to make 
mortgage loans more attractive to lenders, 
the Federal Housing Administration made 
escrow accounts mandatory on all FHA-insured 
mortgage loans. At that time, interest rates 
paid on savings accounts were so low — around 
1 or 2 percent — that no thought was given to 
payment of interest on escrow accounts. In 
fact, some lenders charged an extra fee for 
handling the accounts. Over the years, the 
prepayment of tax and insurance payments into 
escrow accounts that bear no interest became 
established practice within the lending indus-
try, not only for government-insured loans, 
but for conventional mortgage loans as well.; 
But times have changed. Passbook inter-
est rates are no longer at 1 percent. The 
amount of money held in savings accounts is 
at an all-time high and the problem of tax 
foreclosures today is nowhere near what it 
was in the 1930's. As for the escrow funds 
lenders hold, it has become an accepted prac-
tice for many lenders to commingle these funds 
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with other money invested for profit. Thus, 
the lenders have become accustomed to sub-
stantial income from the investment of mort-
gage borrowers' escrow funds, and seldom do 
they share those earnings with the people 
who own the money. 
There are no national figures to show 
how much mortgage lenders earn from the 
interest-free use of escrow money, but a study 
by Prof. John A. Spanogle, Jr., of the Uni-
versity of Main School of Law, estimates it 
at $100 million a year. "Homeowners vs. 
Lenders — A Question of Interest," 38 Con-
sumer Report 202 (1973). 
Plaintiffs' claim is of great significance to the 
entire mortgage lending industry and the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, which regulates all national savings and loan 
associations, including defendant. The claim also affects 
routine real estate contracts, where often it is expressed 
that the buyer's monthly payments include a reserve for 
taxes and insurance. 
The claim of plaintiffs, if successful, would 
adversely affect the marketability of mortgages in the 
secondary market. Mortgages are sold like commodities, 
sometimes outright and sometimes with the seller remaining 
obligated to the buyer to service the loan. 
In defendant's case, in August, 1975, 20,383 
mortgages were on the books, of which (a) 3,749 had been 
sold, including reserves, to 17 different investors, in-
cluding governmental investors such as Federal National 
Mortgage Association, Government National Mortgage Associa-
tion, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporaton and Utah State 
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Retirement Fund; (b) 4,301 participation interests had been 
sold; and (c) 603 were purchased from other original mort-
gagees. About 100 mortgages are sold outright each year and 
are no longer on defendant's books (R.74). 
The Intermountain area is and traditionally has 
been "savings poor," that is, the public does not make 
sufficient time or savings deposits to sustain the growing 
demand for mortgage money for new residential and commercial 
buildings. As a result, defendant and other lenders in this 
area depend upon the secondary market where they, from time 
to time, and not necessarily when a particular mortgage is 
closed, sell mortgages either outright or with participation 
interests to obtain necessary cash for mortgage demands. 
Thus, in August, 1975, defendant had sold interests in 
varying amounts up to 100 percent of 8,050 of the loans it 
was then servicing, or approximately 40 percent. The per-
centage varies from time to time depending upon savings 
deposits and demand for mortgage money, but the ability of 
lenders in our area to sell part of their portfolio is very 
important to sustaining the economy. Loans are sold, in 
whole or in part, to various priviate agencies as well as to 
federal agencies. FHA Regulations (§203.19, C.F.R. 1971) 
require tax and insurance reserves in all FHA mortgages, as 
do Federal Regulations for all savings and loan associations 
on loans over 80 percent of the value of the property 
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(§545.6-l(a) (4) (iii), C.F.R. 1972). These types of loans 
average over 30 percent of defendant's volume. The policy 
of governmental or quasi-governmental agencies in the sec-
ondary market, such as Government National Mortgage Asso-
ciation, Federal National Mortgage Association and Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, is and has been for many, 
many years to require that provision for tax and insurance 
reserves be in the mortgages they purchase as additional 
security on the mortgage, and as a result, the entire sec-
ondary market of private investors so requires. This re-
quirement is imposed because these loans are relatively high 
in ratio of loan to property value, so that without the 
reserve, there would be risk of loss of the security through 
tax sale to collect the prior tax lien or through uninsured 
casualty loss. Hence, it is absolutely necessary for lenders 
in this area, in order to sustain their ability to meet 
demand for additional mortgage funds as required by the 
Intermountain economy, to have the great bulk of their 
portfolio of mortgages in such form as the governmental 
agencies in the secondary market require. In 1954, Federal 
National Mortgage Association, the only governmental agency 
then in the secondary market, required the reserves to be 
separately held in trust in a non-interest bearing checking 
account and separately accounted for. As a result, in the 
past 20 years, all of defendant's residential mortgages made 
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with the expectation of potential sale of the mortgage to 
the secondary market, have required the borrower to pay a 
monthly reserve payment for future taxes and insurance. 
Virtually all lending institutions have similar requirements 
for the same reasons. (Defendant has made a limited number 
of mortgage loans, called "MIL" loans, for such things as 
home improvements, which it does not intend ever to sell to 
secondary markets, at substantially higher interest rates. 
They are not the typical residential first mortgage loans of 
the type herein involved. It has not in the past required 
reserve payments on the MIL loans. The MIL loans are not 
included in the statistical information herein.) Tradi-
tionally, no interest or earnings on such reserves have been 
paid by defendant or other savings and loan associations or 
financial institutions. Lenders must certify annually to 
all investors on loans they service that property taxes have 
been paid. If lenders were required to pay interest or 
earnings on these tax reserves, they would have no ability 
to collect those items on loans sold to others because loans 
are sold in the secondary market on the basis of a fixed, 
net yield to the investor after servicing expenses. Fur-
ther, the ability of lenders in Utah to deal in the sec-
ondary market would be greatly jeopardized, for there is the 
risk that the secondary market simply would deal with the 
Utah mortgage lenders on more burdensome terms, and that 
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would very seriously hurt the Utah economy. Utah lenders 
certainly would have to increase initial service charge fees 
or interest rates to compensate for the difference they 
would be required to pay on reserve accounts (R.281-3). 
If mortgagors were entitled to interest or earn-
ings on the reserves, who would pay it, the original mort-
gagee or the buyer of the mortgage? What law would set the 
ratef the place where the mortgage was made or where the 
holder resides? How could earnings be measured? Would it 
be earnings of the mortgagee or the holder? Would it be 
some percentage of his gross earnings? What if the mort-
gagee has earnings from various types of businesses? Even 
if separate investment were required for reserve funds only, 
lenders could only invest these reserve funds in short-term 
obligations which permit prompt liquidation at tax time. 
Would separate trust investments of reserve funds have to be 
made for each mortgagor? Could the reserve funds be in-
vested for all mortgagors as a class? Is it gross interest 
or earnings that must be paid, or is the gross to be offset 
by the cost of making the investments, of receiving and 
accounting for the budget payments, auditing, cost of ascer-
tainment of the correct amount of taxes and insurance pre-
miums to pay and payment thereof, errors and omissions 
insurance, and the cost of reporting to mortgagors? If it 
is net earnings, how are the expenses to be apportioned 
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among the lender's other expenses? The expense of handling 
each account would be fairly uniform, but some reserve 
accounts would be small so that there would be a net loss on 
the small accounts; if net earnings were to be paid on the 
larger reserve accounts, must the small reserve accounts 
repay the net loss on them? The contract document at bar 
settles none of these problems. To become entangled in 
these problems, and they are myriad, is to simply destroy 
the negotiability of existing mortgage portfolios, for no 
one would or could buy them if to do so would involve prob-
lems of this type. One of the main purposes of federal 
regulation of federal savings and loan associations is to 
protect the federal agency in its acquisition of mortgages 
and related notes from the federal savings and loan associa-
tions. Thus, great deference should be given to the federal 
regulations and the cases which interpret them in deter-
mining whether plaintiffs have a claim against defendant. 
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). Those regula-
tions all imply that plaintiffs1 claim is unfounded. 
Although the secondary mortgage market now re-
quires that reserves be paid on mortgages to be purchased, 
consider that if mortgagees were required to pay interest or 
earnings on the reserves, they would either raise interest 
rates to compensate or, more likely, would cease collecting 
the re-serves in instances where they were not absolutely 
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required by law to collect such reserves. If the latter 
occurred, county governments would be greatly affected, for 
they would no longer receive a few large checks from the 
lending institutions on the exact day taxes are due on the 
many properties involved* That would increase the county's 
cost of receiving individual payments from the mortgagors, 
would impair the dependability of payments on a day certain 
and would increase tax delinquencies. 
Consider that a mortgagee is entitled to have his 
security protected. He is entitled to require by contract 
that the borrower not waste the mortgaged premises, and that 
waste will be an act of default. The risk that the security 
will be lost or impaired through non-payment of the priority 
lien of property taxes or through casualty destruction is a 
real risk. A mortgagee is entitled to require by contract 
that borrowers pay property taxes and insurance premiums 
before they become delinquent to protect against those 
risks. He is entitled to require by contract that borrowers 
post an advance fund for payment of the taxes and insurance 
premiums so that the lender will have funds on hand to pay 
the taxes and insurance premiums as they become due. They 
are entitled to require such advance payments by contract, 
just as much as they are entitled to require a bargained-for 
monthly repayment of the loan and a bargained-for interest 
rate. Indeed, §75-5-5(a)(3), U.C.A., gives specific author-
ity for such in providing: 
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The association may require that the 
equivalent of . . . estimated taxes, insur-
ance premiums and other charges . . . be 
paid each month in advance to the associa-
tion in addition to interest and principal 
payments . . . . 
The amount of the loan, the terms of repayment and the 
interest rate are matters of bargaining between the parties, 
and these are affected by, among other things, the borrower's 
promise to pay in advance to the lender the reserve for 
taxes and insurance premiums. There is nothing "unfair" 
about such a bargain. "No doubt the contracts . . . were 
"adhesion1 contracts, but we are not prepared to hold 
that they were unconscionable . . .," Carpenter v. Suffolk 
Franklin Savings Bank (Mass. 1976), 346 N.E.2d 892. Now, 
considering that the parties have made their bargain as ex-
pressed in the contract, including the rate of interest the 
borrower will pay the lender on the loan and the require-
ment of budget payments for taxes and insurance premiums, as 
well as all other terms, if the parties intended the lender 
to pay the borrower interest or earnings on the reserve 
payments, which could very well affect the interest rate or 
other terms,, would that not be expressed in the agreement? 
How can a mortgagor expect a court to change just that one 
part of the entire bargain? 
Finally, just because interest rates have in-
creased is no reason to change the bargain of the parties to 
say that the contract today requires interest or earnings be 
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paid on reserves when the contract did not so require when 
interest rates were lower; plaintiffs1 interest rate on the 
principal sum does not increase as general interest rates 
increase, and neither should the contract change as to the 
reserve provision. No lender would have been heard to sayf 
in days when it cost more to handle the budget payments and 
keep track of the taxes and insurance premiums than he could 
earn on the reserves, that although there was no provision 
in his contract for such, he should be compensated for his 
loss; just because times have changed does not now permit 
borrowers to change the contract or claim that the contract 
is now unfair. 
Have in mind that it undeniably benefits mort-
gagors, to some degree, to have mortgagees do the accounting 
work to enable a mortgagor to budget in advance for his tax 
and insurance bills, thereby relieving the mortgagor of the 
worry about not having funds to pay -chose large amounts when 
they become due, with attendant worry of the risk of unin-
sured destruction of his property or incurring added penalty 
for non-payment of taxes. Have in mind the de minimus 
effect on each particular mortgage. 
Hence, it is clearly shown that this is not a 
situation 
[I]nvolving an unscrupulous loan shark 
attempting to hide the effective rate of 
a loan throuah deceotive rate disclosures. 
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There is no ethical impropriety accompanying 
the practice which Plaintiffs are attempting 
to discredit, and this is illustrated by 
the fact that the United States Department 
of Housing and Urban Development requires 
maintenance of such escrow accounts for 
FHA insured mortgages. 
Moreover, there is a strong public 
policy which favors the practice of col-
lecting in advance real estate taxes and 
insurance premiums. It extends to the 
borrower a useful and desirable service, 
much in the same manner that the Federal 
and state governments "withhold" taxes to 
insure that funds are available when the 
taxes become due. Defendants should not 
necessarily be expected to perform this 
service gratis. Graybeal v. American Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n., 59 F.R.D. 7, 20 (D.D.C. 
1973). Footnote omitted; emphasis in 
original.) 
Rather, the present case challenges established commercial 
practice that has been at least tacitly approved by both 
Federal and state regulatory authorities for over 20 years 
and which has not been overturned by the legislature of this 
state despite ample opportunities to do so. Indeed, the 
statutes of Utah specifically permit the precise practice of 
which plaintiffs complain. All of this hardly adds up to 
compelling public policy that warrants the type of judicial 
legislation or reformation of contract that plaintiffs cry 
for. 
There are plenty of policy reasons why federal 
savings and loan associations, so heavily regulated on a 
federal basis, should not be required to pay interest or 
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earnings on the reserve accounts on mortgages they make in 
the future. Whatever view one may take as to "fairness," it 
is clear that the F.H.L.B.B. has left, and the courts should 
leave, this decision to the legislatures of the various 
states. The Court should do likewise in view of the new 
federal regulation (12 C.F.R., §545.6-11(c)), stating when 
interest may be paid on these escrows. The legislature can 
act in futuro, balancing on one hand the problem that legis-
lation requiring compensation on reserves will put the 
lenders in the state at a competitive disadvantage, since 
they must either charge higher rates to compensate or elimi-
nate the reserve requirements and, thus, have less secure 
loans to sell in the national secondary market. Against this 
must be balanced any conceived social good arising from the 
legislation. But this is a legislative problem, not a legal 
problem, capable of ex post facto determination by courts 
which must construe existing contracts, not future policy. 
Having all this in mind, it is incredible to think 
the parties intended an implied promise in their contract 
that interest or earnings would be due on these budget 
payments. That brings us to interpretation of plaintiffs1 
contract. 
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POINT II 
BORROWERS DO NOT OWN OR RETAIN ANY INTEREST 
IN THE RESERVE FUNDS 
The monthly budget payments made by plaintiff to 
defendant, which are "estimated to equal" annual taxes and 
insurance premiums are exclusively the property of defendant 
under the contract. The borrowers pay monthly payments of 
principal, interest and budget payments. They make no 
payment into a specific reserve fund. Under the contract 
defendant "may" use the budget portion to pay taxes and 
insurance premiums, may apply the funds to the note, or may 
hold the funds as additional security. Defendant is not 
required to apply them to pay taxes or insurance premiums or 
to any special purpose, as appellants1 brief suggests. 
Plaintiffs do not own the funds or any res. In 
First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Lincoln v. 
The Board of Equalization of Lancaster County, 152 N.W.2d 8 
(Neb. 1967), plaintiff lender challenged governmental taxa-
tion of the reserves, claiming it did not own the funds. 
The Court held that the funds belong to the lender: 
The borrower's only right is to re-
quire that each payment be applied in accor-
dance with the terms of the contract. The 
plaintiffs are not required to keep the ad-
vance payment funds separate, but are per-
mitted to commingle and invest them and keep 
the earnings . . . . 
. . .[T]he advance payments for insurance and 
taxes, when made, become the property of 
the plaintiffs the same as any other pay-
ment required of the borrower . . . . 
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Similarly, in bankruptcy proceedings, the budget 
payments are not the property of the debtor-mortgagor nor 
property which vests in the bankruptcy trustee of a bankrupt 
mortgagor, but rather belong to the lender; In re Simon, 167 
F.Supp. 214 (E.D.N.Y. 1958). Likewise, such payments are 
not subject to proceedings to enforce the rights of judgment 
creditors of the mortgagor; Central Suffolk Hospital Associa-
tion v. Downs, 213 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1961), and Valerio v. College 
Point Savings Bank, 48 Misc.2d 91, 264 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1965). 
A few comments as to non-liability for interest on 
the reserves are appropriate. Since such payments belong 
exclusively to the lender, no implied covenant to pay inter-
est is created, nor is the lender unjustly enriched if the 
payments are invested and a profit made thereon. The situa-
tion is not unique. Lessees frequently pay lessors rent in 
advance for the last month's rent under a lease, or tenants 
post advance security for cleanup at the end of tenancy, or 
persons post cash bonds or deposit money in checking accounts. 
Those situations do not typically require payment of inter-
est or earnings on the funds paid, and the payee is entitled 
to commingle the funds with his own. 
As a matter of general principle, 47 C.J.S., 
Interest, §12, page 23, says in total: 
In the absence of an agreement or 
custom to pay interest on money received 
for the use of another, one who has so 
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received money to hold and pay over to 
the proper person generally is not charge-
able with interest unless he is guilty of 
bad faith or unreasonable delay. 
One who has received money for the 
use of another, but is charged merely with 
the duty of holding the money and paying it 
over to the proper person, generally is not 
chargeable with interest unless he is guilty 
of bad faith or unreasonable delay in deal-
ing with it, or unless there is an agree-
ment to pay interest or a custom to pay 
interest on money so received. Where money 
in a person's possession is retained in good 
faith and without fraud or misconduct on his 
part, he will not be chargeable with inter-
est for such detention. 
Interest is allowable only (1) pursuant to con-
tract, (2) for damages for wrongful detention of money, or 
(3) when provided by statute; 47 C.J.S., Interest, §3, page 
13. No statute is here applicable. Here defendant came 
into possession of the funds rightfully pursuant to the 
contract, and no claim is made that it is wrongfully de-
taining the funds. Where a contract for a loan of money 
does not provide for interest, interest may be charged only 
after default in payment of the principal; Pack v. Dunn, 84 
Utah 597, 37 P.2d 790. Defendant is not in default in 
payment thereof because defendant is entitled to hold the 
funds pursuant to the contract. 
In all the reported cases dealing with the speci-
fic situation at bar, the courts have uniformly rejected 
summarily any claim for interest on the reserve funds. 
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Indeed, in Yudkin v. Avery Savings (Ken. 1974), 507 S.W.2d 
689, the Court noted that these reserve or escrow fund cases 
had recently been reaching the courts with considerable 
frequency, and "in none of the reported cases was there 
found to be any obligation of the lending institution to pay 
interest on the escrowed money." 
POINT III 
UNDER NO THEORY IS DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR EARNINGS 
ON THE RESERVE; DEFENDANT HAS NOT BEEN 
UNJUSTLY ENRICHED 
This case is controlled by §107(1) of the Restate-
ments of Restitution, which provides: 
(1) A person of full capacity who, 
pursuant to a contract with another, has 
performed services or transferred property 
to the other or otherwise has conferred a 
benefit upon him, is not entitled to com-
pensation therefor other than in accordance 
with the terms of such bargain, unless the 
transaction is rescinded for fraud, mistake, 
duress, undue influence or illegality, or 
unless the other has failed to perform his 
part of the bargain. 
None of the exceptions apply here; plaintiffs do not claim 
the loan transaction should be rescinded. The terms of the 
bargain do not provide for any compensation as claimed by 
plaintiffs. 
As stated in Baugh v. Parley, 184 P.2d 335 (Utah, 
1947) at 337: 
Unjust enrichment of a person occurs 
when he has and retains money or benefits 
which in justice and equity belong to another. 
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. . . The mere fact that a person benefits 
another is not of itself sufficient to require 
the other to make restitution therefor. Re-
statement of Restitution, §1, Comment C. 
Schott v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Pa. 
1969), 259 A.2d 443, held: 
The quasi-contractual doctrine of un-
just enrichment is inapplicable when the 
relationship between the parties is founded 
on a written agreement of express contract. 
Any interpretation of the deed of trust must begin 
with the document itself. The accounting for earnings on 
the fund is of such importance, and the manner of performing 
is so complex and variable, that had the parties so intended, 
appropriate provisions would have been included in the docu-
ment. The absence of such a provision indicates the lack of 
such a requirement. No "implied term" as claimed by plain-
tiffs can be discerned from the deed of trust, nor from the 
action of the parties; indeed, the action of the parties is 
entirely to the contrary. 
Plaintiffs have not cited a single case where a 
borrower recovered earnings on the reserve funds. Our 
research has not disclosed any such cases. 
The great majority of courts have expressly held, 
on either motion to dismiss the complaint or on summary 
judgment, that the lender, as a matter of law, has no obli-
gation to pay interest or earnings on the reserve funds; 
Zelickman v. Bell Federal Savings (111. 1973), 301 N.E.2d 
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47; Sears v. Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 275 N.E.2d 300 
(111. 1971); Brooks v. Valley National Bank (Ariz. 1975), 
539 P. 2d 958? Surrey Strathitiore Corp. v. Dollar Savings Bank 
of New York (C.A.N.Y. 1975), 36 N.Y.2d 173, 325 N.E.2d 527; 
Gibson v. First Federal of Detroit, (C.A.6th 1974), 504 F.2d 
826; Richman v. Security Savings & Loan Assn. (Wise. 1973), 
204 N.W.2d 511; Durkee v. Franklin Sav. Assn. (111. 1974), 
309 N.E. 2d 118; Umdenstock v. Am. Mortgage & Investment Co. 
(D.C. Okla. 1973), 363 F.Supp. 1375; Manchester Gardens, Inc. 
v. Great West Life Assurance Co. (C.A.D.C. 1953), 205 F.2d 
872; Stavrides v. Maryland National Bank (W.D.Pa. 1973), 353 
F.Supp. 1972; Stavrides v. Mellon National Bank (1973), 487 
F.2d 953; Yudkin v. Avery Savings (Ken. 1974), 507 S.W.2d 
689; Anno. 50 A.L.R.3d 697. Other cases where borrowers 
have been unsuccessful on such theories as breach of con-
tract, breach of trust, unjust enrichment, fraud, truth-in-
lending, antitrust, pledgor-pledgee or agency, include: 
Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 365 
F.Supp. 975 (E.D.Pa. 1973); Tierney v. Whitestone Sav. & 
Loan Assn., 83 Misc.2d 855, 373 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1975); Tucker 
v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (Ark. 1972), 381 S.W.2d 
725; Cale v. American Nat'l Bank (1973), 370.Ohio Misc. 56; 
Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Sav. Bank (Mass. 1976), 346 
N.E.2d 892. 
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This is an impressive body of law. All the courts 
have reasoned that whether a trust was intended depends upon 
the intent of the parties, as manifested by the contract. 
Most have held, even though in the contract there was no 
expression one way or another as to interest or earnings on 
the reserve, that the contract was unambiguous and did not 
permit recovery. 
The courts have followed the language of the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §12, Comment 1 (1959): 
Where the deposit is in escrow, 
that is where the money is to be paid to 
a third person on the happening of a 
designated event and in the meantime the 
depositor has no right to withdraw the money, 
it depends upon the manifestation of the 
intention of the parties whether the bank 
may use as its own the money deposited 
or whether the money shall be held in 
trust. Such a deposit ordinarily indi-
cates an intention that the bank may use 
the money as its own . . . . 
Zelickman, supra, is factually indistinguishable 
from this case. There the mortgage required the borrower: 
(3) To pay when due all taxes and 
assessments levied against said property 
or any part thereof under any existing or 
future law, and to deliver receipts for 
such payments to the Mortgagee promptly 
upon demand. 
(9) To provide for payments of taxes, 
assessments and insurance premiums, stipu-
lated to be paid hereunder, the Mortgagor 
shall deposit with the Mortgagee on each 
monthly payment date an amount equal to 
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one-twelfth of the annual taxes ana assess-
ments levied against said premises and one-
twelfth of the annual premium on all such 
insurance, as estimated by the Mortgagee. 
All such deposits as made are pledged as 
additional security for the payment of the 
principal mortgage indebtedness. If default 
is made in the payment of said deposits, the 
Mortgagee may, at its option, charge the same 
to the unpaid balance of the mortgage indebted-
ness and the same shall bear interest at the 
same rate as the principal mortgage indebted-
ness. As taxes and assessments become due and 
payable and as insurance policies expire, or 
premiums thereon become due, the Mortgagee is 
authorized to use such deposits for the purpose 
of paying taxes or assessments, or renewing 
insurance policies or paying premiums thereon. 
In the event any deficit shall exist or the 
deposits are so reduced that the remaining 
deposits together with the monthly deposits 
will not provide sufficient funds to pay 
the then current calander [sic] year's esti-
mated taxes or the estimated insurance pre-
mium on the last day of said year, the Mort-
gagee may, at its option, either declare imme-
diately due and payable or add to the unpaid 
balance of the mortgage indebtedness secured 
hereby such a sum which shallr together with 
the remaining deposits and monthly deposits, 
provide sufficient funds to pay one year's 
estimated taxes or insurance premiums on the 
last day of said year. (Emphasis added.) 
That language is. virtually identical to the language in the 
case at bar. The Court there said, in sustaining summary 
judgment for the lender: 
Counsel for plaintiffs . . . urge that 
deposits made each month by plaintiffs of 
sums for payment of taxes and insurance 
premiums, are trust funds. They predicate 
this contention primarily upon three key 
words, "deposit," "pledged" and "authorized." 
They urge that these deposits, being made 
for specific and limited purposes, become 
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trust funds and that this conclusion is 
fortified by the pledge of the deposits, 
which also constitutes a trust, as well as 
by use of the word "authorized." 
The complaint alleged that these 
monies paid to defendant by plaintiffs 
as tax and insurance deposits were held 
by defendant as a trustee or fiduciary 
so that defendant owed a duty to segregate 
the trust funds and to account to plain-
tiffs for earnings and profits resulting 
therefrom. 
In our opinion, no express trust can 
be drawn from the language of the loan 
application or of the mortgage or from 
both of these documents combined. Plain-
tiffs covenanted to pay when due all taxes 
and assessments and all insurance premiums. 
Payment of these items thus became a pri-
mary obligation of plaintiffs with the 
contractual right vested in defendant to 
advance these items in default of pay-
ment by plaintiffs. Consequently, para-
graph 9 of the mortgage above quoted should 
necessarily be construed simply as another 
security device granted expressly to defen-
dant as mortgagee to assist it in making 
certain that, when the taxes and insurance 
premiums come due, funds will be available 
for their prompt payment. In no sense can 
the language of this instrument be construed 
as creating an express trust for the bene-
fit of plaintiffs. . . . 
The Court noted that while the mortgage required "deposits" 
"pledged" for taxes and insurance, it emphasized a number of 
other important elements including the need to examine and 
to give "meaning, life and effect" to all of the pertinent 
language in the legal document in question. It pointed out 
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the absence of language requiring that the tax and insurance 
account be "segregated," "separated" or "isolated." It 
commented upon language authorizing authorizing defendant to 
use the deposits for payment of taxes or insurance premiums. 
It noted the pledge of the tax and insurance account as 
further security for the indebtedness due and the lack of 
provision for repayment of deposits. It held that even if 
the payments there were described as "deposits," no trust 
would result. It pointed out the complete lack of "a res or 
specific property" which "is essential for the existence of 
a trust." It commented upon the lack of "a segregated 
deposit set up solely for a specific purpose." It cited and 
quoted from other cases and from the regulations of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, all of which supported the 
conclusion that there was no trust. In holding that as a 
matter of law plaintiffs could not recover under an implied 
trust theory, it stated that "implied trusts may be further 
categorized into constructive and resulting trust." It held 
there was no resulting trust which is generally defined and 
limited to situations in which land or other property is 
bought with the money of one person and title is taken in 
the name of another. It held a constructive trust arises 
solely by operation of law only when fraud is proved or when 
advantage is taken of a fiduciary relationship by the domi-
nant party. There were no allegations in the complaint 
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regarding fraud of any kind. It held there is no fiduciary 
or confidential relationship existing merely by virtue of 
the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee. Plaintiffs' 
brief says Zelickman did not discuss plaintiffs' "pledge" 
theory. On the contrary, Zelickman specifically noted that 
plaintiff's contention was predicated on the use of the key 
word "pledged" and rejected it, citing Sears v. Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Assoc., 275 N.E.2d 300 (Ill.App. 1971). 
In Sears, the trial court granted defendant's 
motion to dismiss the complaint. In affirming, the appel-
late court gave several reasons for its decision that the 
defendant was not obligated in law or equity, to account for 
or distribute earnings to borrowers, including: 
First, defendant was not required by the contract 
to segregate or separate the payments from other accounts, 
but was merely obligated by contract to pay the insurance 
and taxes when due. The absence of terms requiring segre-
gation or separation was held to show a lack of intent that 
a special deposit was created. 
Second, the Court held: 
The monthly payments paid to defen-
dant are not deposits in any legal sense 
of that term, but they are simply payments 
by a debtor upon amounts due the creditor. 
Third, contrary to plaintiffs' contention here, 
the Court held every pledge does not create a trust. The 
Court said: 
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We must expressly reject plaintiff's 
argument that a trust is created because 
of use of the word "pledge" in the note. . . . 
This contention is a complete oversimplifi-
cation and is based upon the most elementary 
deductive reasoning. The syllogism is: 
Every pledge is a trust. This note con-
tains a pledge. Therefore this note is a 
trust. However, the major premise is com-
pletely invalid. Every pledge is not a 
trust. Circumstances may arise in the course 
of any pledge situation in which some of 
the attributes of a trust appear; particu-
larly with reference to management or reduc-
tion to possession of collateral. This is 
the type of situation which appears in the 
cases cited by plaintiff. . . . A pledgee 
who does not deal properly with property 
of the pledgor in his possession may be 
charged with fiduciary responsibility because 
he has become a constructive trustee or a 
trustee ex maleficio. However, this does 
not mean, and cannot mean, that every pledgee 
is a trustee of an express trust. 
It is true, as plaintiff argues, ". . . 
that the general property or title to the 
property pledged remains in the pledgor 
. . .," subject to the lien or rights of 
the pledgee until the debt has been paid. . . . 
But, this merely points up and emphasizes 
the distinction of a pledge from the case 
at bar. Here, when monthly payments were 
made, the mortgagor divested himself of all 
rights to the amount paid and relied directly 
and solely upon the contractual obligation 
of defendant to pay insurance and taxes. It 
could be argued with greater force, and with 
considerably more logic, that the language, 
"If such sums are held in trust or carried 
in a borrower's tax and insurance account . . . " 
accentuates the absence of trust attributes 
from the second option because it specifically 
states the trust or first option as one 
alternative and the borrower's accounts as 
the second. 
Fourth, even if the payments could be designated 
"deposits" rather than "payments," a trust to hold the funds 
in a special deposit was not created. 
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Fifth, the regulations of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board that a lender may require the monthly payments 
"have the force and effect of law," and "this specific 
regulation for advance payments by the borrower negates the 
idea that such payments are deposits which are to be held as 
a trust for the benefit of the debtor." 
The case presented by plaintiffs to this Court is 
so similar to the Zelickman and Sears cases that the same 
result follows. The deed of trust, like the note in Zelickman 
and Sears, provides, at the option of defendant, (1) for the 
pledge of the budget payments as additional security; (2) 
withdrawal of the payments for payment of taxes and insur-
ance; or (3) for application of the budget payments to sums 
due under the deed of trust. Unlike Sears, defendant here 
is not obligated to pay the taxes and insurance; defendant 
could simply hold the funds as additional security or could 
apply them, as additional monthly payments, to the note. 
Here, the deed of trust, unlike the note in Sears, makes no 
reference to a trust where the monthly payments would be 
maintained until payment of the taxes and insurance. 
Both Sears and Zelickman expressly rejected plain-
tiffs1 general theorizing about the use of the word "pledge" 
in this specific situation. 
A deposit of money as security for the performance 
of a contract creates only a debtor-creditor relationship 
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and is not a true pledge; Wilcox v. Gauntlett (Mich.), 166 
N.W. 856; 72 C.J.S., Pledges §9, page 10. "[A] pledge . . . 
is the passing of the possession of a chattel by thereof to 
the pledge . . .; Campbell v. Peter, 108 Utah 565, 167 P.2d 
754 (1945). None of the "pledge" cases cited in plaintiffs1 
brief deal with this situation here; they all involve pledges 
of chattels or stock. 
Brooks v. Valley National Bank, supra, is the 
second most recent case in point, and Carpenter v. Suffolk 
Franklin Savings Bank (Mass. May, 1976), 346 N.E.2d 892 
(Carpenter II), is the most recent. Both traced prior 
precedent, noting only three prior cases (including Carpen-
ter I at 291 N.E.2d 609), which upheld borrowers1 claims on 
a pleadings basis only. Both noted the overwhelming major-
ity of cases denying borrower recovery as a matter of law 
under any theory and followed the majority. Both distin-
guished the three prior cases on grounds here applicable. 
I n
 Brooks, the appellate court sustained summary 
judgment for the lender, saying: 
[A]11 jurisdictions which have considered 
this problem, reaching either pro or con 
conclusions, have relied primarily upon 
the same underlying legal principles in 
reaching their respective conclusions. 
In our opinion, these agreed upon 
principles are: 
(1) That the presence or absence of words 
such as "in trust", "trustee" or "bene-
ficiary" do not necessarily manifest 
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an intent to create a trust relation-
ship. (Citation omitted.) 
(2) Whether a trust is created depends upon 
the intention of the parties to be 
ascertained from their words, and 
conduct in light of the surrounding 
circumstances. (Citation omitted.) 
(3) A debt is not a trust. Restatement 
2d., Trust §12. 
(4) In establishing a trust there must 
be a res or specific property that 
form the subject matters of the trust. 
Sears v. First Federal Savings & Loan 
Ass'n., supra, Bogert, Trust and 
Trustees, §111 (2nd Ed. 1964). 
. . .[T]he mortgage in this case pro-
vides: 
" . . . the mortgagor, in order more 
fully to protect the security of this 
mortgage, covenants and agrees as 
follows: 
2. That, together with, and in 
addition to, the monthly payments 
of principal and interest payable 
under the terms of this note secured 
hereby the mortgagor will pay to the 
mortgagee, on the 1st day of each 
month until the said note is fully 
paid, the following sums: 
(a) [l/12th of the annual mort-
gage insurance premium required by 
the National Housing Act, if the 
note is secured under the provisions 
of that act.] 
(b) A sum equal to [1/12 of 
hazard insurance premiums and taxes 
due], such sums to be held by mort-
gagor in trust to pay said . . . pre-
miums [and] taxes . . . . 
(c) All payments mentioned in 
the two preceding subsections of 
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this paragraph and all payments to 
be made under the note secured 
hereby shall be added together and 
the aggregate amount thereof shall 
be paid by the mortgagor each month 
in a single payment to be applied 
by mortgagee to the following item 
in the order set forth: 
(I) Premium charges under con-
tract of insurance with the Federal 
Housing Commissioner. 
(ii) Ground rents, taxes, spe-
cial assessments, fire and other 
hazard insurance premiums [the im-
pounds involved here], 
(iii) Interest on the note secured 
hereby; and 
(IV) Amortization of the princi-
pal of said note." 
Looking at the cold language of the docu-
ment in question it appears that the intent 
of the parties was that payment of impounds 
was made "in order more fully to protect 
the security of this mortgage." Consistent 
with this intent is the provision that 
failure to pay impounds will "constitute 
an event of default under this mortgage," 
leading to foreclosure of the security. 
It would appear that this right to foreclose 
upon failure to pay impounds is more compatible 
with a debtor-creditor relationship than with 
a trustee-beneficiary relationship. The mort-
gage also provides that these impounds in 
addition to being used for the payment of 
taxes and insurance premiums can, under cer-
tain circumstances, be used to reduce the 
principal indebtedness of the mortgagor. 
Again, this provision is inconsistent with 
the theory that a special res of the trust 
was intended to be created for the purpose 
of paying debts due third parties. Finally, 
the mortgage document provides that a lump 
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aggregate sum is to be paid by the mortgagor 
and the mortgagee is given authority to 
allocate this single sum among various items 
in a descending order of priority. Such 
authorization is normally not afforded a 
trustee, because the exercise of such authority 
could theoretically, if the amount received 
was insufficient to cover all items to which 
payment is allocated, cause a foreclosure and 
thus destruction of the res of the trust. 
Admittedly, that portion of the payment 
received by the mortgagee as impounds was 
intended by the parties to be used pri-
marily for a given purpose, that is, the 
payment of taxes on the premises used as 
security for the loan and the payment of 
insurance premiums, insuring the premises. 
Does this intent to use these funds for a 
specific purpose create a trust relationship 
between the parties? 
The only language in the document 
which could be construed as an intent to 
create such a trust relationship is that 
the mortgagee shall hold the impound "in 
trust." However, when we consider the 
conduct of the parties herein, as that 
conduct can be construed to relate to their 
intent, the mortgagee has specifically negated 
such an intent by its affidavit in support 
of the motion for summary judgment. On the 
mortgagor's part, Brooks1 predecessor in 
interest for a period of more than ten years, 
acquiesced in the mortgagee using these 
funds in a manner inconsistent with a 
trust relationship. 
Looking, then, to both the written 
words and the conduct of the parties, we 
find no factual dispute that the parties 
did not intend the use of the words "in 
trust" to create a trust relationship as to 
impounds. Rather., we are of the opinion, 
again from the language of the mortgage and 
from the parties1 conduct, that the intent 
of the parties was that the Bank became 
contractually obligated to make the pay-
ment of taxes and insurance due on the 
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mortgaged premises to the extent that the 
borrower made monies available to make such 
payment. To express this intent, they 
used the words "in trust." . . . This 
did not create a trust relationship, but 
merely a debtor-creditor relationship with 
the creditor contractually bound to use a 
portion of the funds received for a speci-
fic purpose. We so hold. 
We turn now to Brooks' argument that 
his complaint validly stated a cause of 
action for "unjust enrichment". It is 
generally held that unjust enrichment occurs 
when one person has money which in justice 
and equity belongs to another. 66 Am.Jur.2d 
Restitution and Implied Contracts, §3, pg. 945. 
Therefore, in order for Brooks to have stated 
a valid cause of action against the Bank for 
unjust enrichment it was incumbent upon him 
to show that the impounds "belonged" to him. 
Our previous discussion dealing with the 
trust argument negates such an ownership 
interest in the impounds. We have held that 
the payment made by Brooks to the bank, in-
cluding the amount for impounds, is in satis-
faction of a debtor-creditor relationship 
created by the mortgage document. In satis-
faction of that relationship, Brooks retains 
no more ownership in the funds paid as impounds 
than he does in the principal and interest due 
the Bank. What does "belong" to Brooks is a 
cause of action against the Bank to require 
it to perform its contractual obligation by 
paying taxes and insurance to third parties 
to the extent that Brooks has made funds 
available for this purpose. 
We therefore hold that payment of monthly 
installments to the Bank, which installments 
include monies for taxes and insurance are in 
satisfaction of a debtor-creditor relationship 
and upon receipt of these funds, title passes 
to the Bank with the corresponding contractual 
obligation to apply these funds in accordance 
with that contract. 
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In Carpenter II, supra the most recent case in 
point, the Court affirmed dismissal of the complaint after 
trial on the merits. The findings by the Court on trial 
there are no different than the undisputed facts here before 
the Court. It held: 
Nothing is said in the statutes or the 
written agreements of the parties as to 
interest on the payments or fruits of 
the investment. The general understand-
ing and practice in Massachusetts and 
elsewhere over a period of some forty 
years has been that the bank has the right 
to treat the tax payments as its own. 
We think that a mortgagor who claims that 
he has made a different arrangement must 
have a clear understanding to that effect. 
See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §12, 
comment e (1959); 4 A. Scott, The Law 
of Trust §530 (3d Ed. 1967). No such 
showing was made. 
The judge ruled that neither the 
nature of the transaction between the 
plaintiffs and Suffolk Franklin nor 
their relationship now calls for the 
imposition of a resulting trust. We agree, 
substantially for the same reasons that 
we uphold his finding that there was no 
express trust . . . . 
. . . No doubt the contracts between 
the plaintiffs and the bank were "adhesion" 
contracts, but we are not prepared to hold 
that they were unconscionable in the as-
pects here in issue. . . . Customers who 
adhere to standardized contractual terms ordi-
narily "understand that they are assenting 
to the terms not read or not understood, sub-
ject to such limitations as the law may 
impose." See Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts §237, comment b (Tent. Drafts Nos. 
1-7, 1973). 
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The enrichment of the bank may have 
been unjust in some sense. Apparently the 
Legislature thought so when it enacted 
G.L. c. 183, §61, inserted by St.1973, 
c. 299, §1, effective July 1, 1975 [re-
quires that, two years hence, interest be 
paid on reserves "once a year and in a 
manner to be determined by the mortgagee"]. 
But most of the unjust enrichment, if any, 
enriched the bank's depositors at the time. 
The plaintiffs do not suggest that those 
depositors should now disgorge their excess 
returns. Thus a judgment of restitution 
would ultimately result in a transfer of 
funds from present and future depositors 
to compensate for excess payments to past 
depositors. Doubtless for this reason the 
Legislature enacted its reform with an 
effective date over two years after enact-
ment. We do not think we should go further 
in disrupting legitimate expectations than 
the Legislature was willing to go. 
Moreover, the statutory reform requires 
that interest be paid "at least once a year 
at a rate and in a manner to be determined 
by the mortgagee." We infer that the Legis-
lature thought the amount of the banks' un-
just enrichment would be very difficult to 
measure by any objective standards. We are 
not prepared to substitute our judgment on 
this point for that of the Legislature. In 
this aspect, this case is a good illustra-
tion of the advantages of legislative law 
reform as compared with reform by judicial 
decision. There was no such unjust enrich-
ment, we hold, as to justify the imposition 
of a constructive trust. 
In Surrey Strathmore Corp. v. Dollar Savings Bank, 
supra, the Court of Appeals of New York, in granting the 
lender's motion to dismiss, said: 
In the circumstances of the relation-
ship between these parties it does not 
advance our inquiry into the determination 
of the rights of the mortgagor or of the 
obligations of the mortgagee to proceed 
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in reliance on categorical concepts sug-
gested by such labels as "trust", "agency", 
"escrow", "debtor-creditor", for it must 
be evident that the relationship here does 
not fall essentially under any one of such 
classical headings or any identifiable com-
bination of them. Reasoning predicated on 
such concepts would accordingly be untrust-
worthy. We cannot, for instance, ground any 
conclusion on the use of the words "in trust" 
in this particular mortgage clause. Resolu-
tion of the issues must depend rather on 
what rights and obligations the parties are 
found to have intended to create as mani-
fested by the words they used in their 
written agreement, with parol evidence 
admissible to clarify ambiguities, if any, 
under recognized canons of construction. 
Preliminarily we note that the case 
is before us on the Bank's motion to dis-
miss the petition for failure to state a 
cause of action. Pursuant to the provi-
sions of CPLR 3211(c) the parties submitted 
affidavits and the courts below have in 
effect treated the motion as a motion for 
summary judgment. The affidavits submitted 
by the parties raise no issues of fact or 
credibility, anticipate the availability 
of no additional extrinsic evidence, and 
identify no factual inferences to be drawn 
from extrinsic evidence. In this circum-
stance then there is no occasion for fact-
finding by a jury and the issue is to be 
determined by the court as a matter of law. 
(Citations omitted.) 
We observe that the written expression 
of the agreement of the parties contains no 
explicit provision, one way or the other, 
with respect to payment of interest or 
earnings on the tax payments. The payment 
of interest or earnings was not indispensible 
to effectuate the. objectives of the mortgage 
agreement and there is no other provision of 
the written instrument from which it may be 
inferred that the parties intended that 
there be payment of interest or earnings. 
Indeed, from the parties1 silence the in-
ference may be drawn that no such payment 
- 39 -
was intended. Even the canon of construc-
tion that a written instrument is to be 
interpreted against the party responsible 
for its draftsmanship cannot be employed 
conclusively to fill hiatuses in the instru-
ment or to supply terms as to which the 
parties themselves omitted to make any pro-
vision. There being no express agreement 
of the parties and no predicate for any 
inference that such an agreement was in-
tended, we conclude that this mortgagor is 
not entitled to the relief it now seeks. 
To the extent that it might be argued 
that the mere absence of an express provi-
sion that the mortgagor would not be en-
titled to any payments, in the context of 
the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship, 
creates an ambiguity as to the intention 
of the parties, we turn to the relevant 
parol evidence to resolve any such ambi-
quity. Here we have the undisputed proof 
as to what was said when the agreement was 
signed at the closing. [Plaintiff asked 
at closing if interest would be paid on 
reserves and was told "no.") That evidence 
explicitly confirms the earlier inference 
that no payment was intended. While it may 
be said that only the word "interest" was 
then used, in context we can only conclude 
that this mortgagor intended, when the ques-
tion was asked and answered, to inquire whether 
the bank as mortgagee would make any return 
payment, however characterized, with respect 
to monies paid by the mortgagor into the tax 
account. The answer was a categorical "no". 
To the extent that as a matter of pub-
lic policy restrictions should be placed on 
the absolute freedom of either party to an 
agreement of the sort here involved to 
impose terms on the other, the issue is one 
for legislative address. 
Plaintiffs' theory of "special bank deposits" 
(Point IV, appellants1 brief) is answered best by Durkee 
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v, Franklin Savings Association, supra (111. 1974), which 
sustained summary judgment holding such reserve payments are 
not special deposits and the mortgage is not required to 
account for profits thereon. It held that bank deposit 
relationships, general or special, are contractual relation-
ship arising from the delivery of money by the depositor to 
the bank, but that in the case at bar, the contractual 
relationship did not arise from the delivery of the first 
monthly reserve payment, but arose from the mortgage docu-
ment wherein the borrower promised to pay the monthly re-
serve to the bank, that the reserve payments did not con-
stitute deposits in the legal sense of that term and, there-
fore, they could not be special deposits. Of the cases 
plaintiffs' brief cites in support of their proposition, 
only Carpenter I, supra, is in point, and Durkee distin-
guishes Carpenter I on grounds here applicable, that in 
Carpenter I the Court did not have before it the mortgage 
document for construction. 
The same reasoning which destroys plaintiffs1 
"special deposit" theory also applies to and destroys plain-
tiff's "agency" theory (Point III, appellants1 brief). 
Plaintiffs did not pay the reserves to defendant under 
circumstances manifesting mutual intent that defendant would 
hold or use the funds subject to plaintiffs' right of con-
trol. Instead, plaintiffs paid the funds in performance of 
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their contract so to do. Plaintiff's agency theory is 
wholly unsupported by any authority in this specific instance. 
Only three cases give appellants any breath of 
hope. One is Carpenter I, supra, which Carpenter II, 
supra, handles. Brooks, supra, distinguished and declined 
to follow Carpenter I, saying: 
The Massachusetts appellate court 
did not have before it the mortgage document 
which it was alleged created the trust agree-
ment and thus was limited to a determination 
of whether, if true, the allegation of the 
mortgagor's complaint stated a cause of 
action. 
The same distinction may be made of appellants1 
second case, Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Svgs. & Loan Assn. 
(Pa. 1974), 320 A.2d 117, where judgment dismissing the 
complaint for failure to state a claim was reversed and the 
case was remanded expressly to determine the language of the 
mortgage: 
Reversal . . . is required because 
this court cannot say with assurance that 
the trial court considered each mortgage 
and bond agreement individually when it 
concluded that appellant could not estab-
lish in any circumstance the existence of 
a trust relationship. 
Here, contrary to Carpenter I and Buchanan, the exact mort-
gage language is before the Court. 
Buchanan and Carpenter are distinguishable because 
both cases arose upon motion to dismiss complaints which did 
not specifically allege the contract terms; the complaints 
- 42 -
there merely alleged in general terms the fact of the escrow 
payments and claimed such "created trust" or "unjustly en-
riched" the mortgagee and, hence, the appellate courts 
remanded for appropriate findings. 
Abrams v. Crocker Citizens National Bank (1974), 
114 Cal.Rptr. 913f is the only other case found by us or 
cited by plaintiffs that did not grant judgment in favor of 
the mortgagee as a matter of law. That case arose upon 
summary judgment. The appellate court noted the mortgage 
required the bank to "hold such . . .payments in trust to 
pay . . . premiums and taxes," and noted conflicting affi-
davits filed by the parties, the mortgagor saying he in-
tended the reserves to be held in trust by the bank, and the 
bank saying it did not so intend. The Court held the inten-
tion of the parties was controlling and remanded for trial 
because of 
[A] factual conflict between appellant's 
declaration that they expected and intended 
the funds to be held in trust and respondent's 
declaration that it never intended to create 
a trust." 
Here, the mortgage does not require the funds to be held in 
trust. Abrams is contrary to the other cases and is weak in 
any event, for really, the unexpressed subjective intent of 
the parties is not admissible. Here, plaintiffs filed no 
counter-affidavits as in Abrams. No factual conflict here 
exists, for plaintiffs have admitted they paid the monthly 
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payments for 11 years without expectation that interest or 
earnings would be paid thereon. That admission and distinc-
tion brings us to our final point. 
POINT IV 
THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTIAL CONSTRUCTION SHOWS 
THE PARTIES DID NOT INTEND THE CONTRACT 
TO REQUIRE PAYMENT OF INTEREST OR EARNINGS 
ON THE RESERVE; 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS HERE PROPER 
The deed of trust here does not expressly require 
defendant to pay interest nor to make an accounting of 
earnings. Plaintiffs claim such an obligation resulted from 
an "implied term." This Court has stated that "the doctrine 
of practical construction may be applied only when the 
contract is ambiguous"; Bullfrog Marinaf Inc. v. Lentz, 28 
U.2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972). There is no ambiguity in the 
deed of trust — defendant is not required to pay interest 
and is not required to account to plaintiffs concerning 
plaintiffs1 budget payments; the great majority of cases 
stated in Point III support defendant's position as a matter 
of law. Should the Court consider the minority view as 
stated in only the Carpenter I, Buchanan and Abrams cases, 
then parol evidence would become admissibly. 
The only parol evidence here shows, without con-
tradiction or conflict: 
(1) Plaintiffs knew at the time they closed the 
mortgage that defendant required budget payments and 
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did not pay interest or earnings thereon. While plain-
tiffs thought this was unfair, they did not discuss the 
subject at closing or request any change in the contract. 
(2) Plaintiffs have paid all budget payments for 
11 years without expectation or request to receive any 
earnings on the budget payments. 
Under the doctrine of practical construction, a 
contract may be interpreted consistent with the actions of 
the parties. Bullough v. Sims, 16 U.2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 
(1965); Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 U.2d 320, 266 P.2d 
494 (1954), Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, (Utah 1975), 534 P.2d 
85. It is conclusively here shown that the parties did not 
intend any contractual obligation requiring defendant to pay 
interest or account for profits in connection with the 
budget payments. 
"In the interpretation of contracts, the interpre-
tation given by the parties themselves as shown by their 
acts will be adopted by the court"; Hardinge Co. v. Eimco 
Corp., supra, 266 P.2d at 496. See also 3 Corbin on Contracts, 
§558 (1960) at page 249, et seq. 
In Surrey Strathmore Corp. v. Dollar Savings Bank, 
supra, the Court looked to the conversation between the 
parties at time of closing to resolve any ambiguity. The 
mortgagor asked if interest would be paid on the reserves 
and was told no. The Court, in affirming summary judgment 
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for the bank, held that if parol evidence were admissible, 
that evidence would require granting summary judgment. In 
Carpenter II and Brooks v. Valley National Bank, supra, the 
Court held the same type of conduct by plaintiffs adminis-
tered the coup de grace to their claims. Plaintiffs here 
did not ask at closing because they admittedly knew defend-
ant would not pay interest or earnings on the reserves. 
That knowledge equally confirms that no question of fact 
here exists as to such parol evidence, and the case is, 
therefore, ripe for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs here may not even claim the benefit of 
conflicting parol evidence of intent of the parties, as in 
Carpenter I, Buchanan.and Abrams. Here, plaintiffs not only 
moved for summary judgment themselves, they took the posi-
tion before the trial court "that defendant is liable as a 
matter of law to plaintiffs upon the written contract al-
leged in the Amended Complaint and that parol evidence is 
inadmissible" (R.479). They took that position in urging 
their motion for summary judgment and in resisting defen-
dant's motion. They offered no evidence or affidavits what-
ever except the written trust agreement. The reason plain-
tiffs must take such position is obvious; the parol evidence 
of their conduct overwhelmingly shows the parties did not 
intend defendant must account for earnings on the reserves. 
That being so, even if the Court were inclined to follow the 
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minority Buchanan and Carpenter I cases, the result would be 
no different on trial, 
CONCLUSION 
On principle, on custom, on past practice between 
the parties, on plaintiffs' admitted knowledge, on obvious 
practical requirements of business, on the language of the 
particular contract pleaded, and on any theory of implied 
interest, trust or unjust enrichment, plaintiffs1 complaint 
on this particular contract must fail, for upon the undis-
puted facts, plaintiffs may not recover as a matter of law 
on this contract for the relief prayed for. It is signi-
ficant that not one case has held a lender must pay interest 
or earnings on mortgage reserves, while numerous cases have 
summarily held he need not, in sound, logical, authoritative 
decisions. 
The Summary Judgment should be affirmed and defen-
dant should be awarded its costs. 
DATED this day of September, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
By 
Joseph J. Palmer 
Attorney for Defendant 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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